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SUMMARY
The Alberta government’s 2009 New Royalty Framework elicited resistance
on the part of the energy industry, leading to subsequent  reductions in the
royalties imposed on natural gas and conventional oil. However, the oil
sands sector, subject to different terms, quickly accepted the new
arrangement with little complaint, recognizing it as win-win situation for
industry and the government. Under the framework, Alberta recoups much
more money in royalties — about $1 billion over the two year period of
2009 and 2010 — without impinging significantly on investment in the oil
sands. This brief paper demonstrates that by spreading the financial risks
and benefits to everyone involved, the new framework proves it’s possible
to generate increased revenue without frightening off future investment. The
same model could conceivably be applied to the conventional oil and
natural gas sectors.
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The purpose of this communiqué is to briefly review the changes to the oil sands royalty
regime implemented in 2009 and shed some light on some of the implications of the changes.
In particular, it will show that:
• The changes to the treatment of oil sands introduced in 2009 have resulted in a significant
increase in royalties collected from the oil sands relative to the previous system, helping to
make the oil sands the single biggest contributor to royalties from non-renewable resources
in Alberta. Specifically, the new regime increased government of Alberta revenue by about
$1 billion over the two-year period of 2009 and 2010.
• This was accomplished without significantly impinging upon the incentive to invest in the
oil sands, and without generating a good deal of resistance from the oil sands sector. This is
due largely to the way in which the oil sands royalties are structured.
French economist Jean-Baptiste Colbert (Minister of Finance under King Louis XIV) famously
quipped that, “the art of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain the largest
amount of feathers with the least possible amount of hissing.”
It may be an understatement to say that the changes to the oil and gas royalty regime in Alberta
over the last four years have generated a certain amount of “hissing.” Following the release of
the Royalty Review report in September 2007, the government of Alberta introduced the New
Royalty Framework, implemented on January 1, 2009. The rather vehement reaction on the part
of the oil patch to the new framework has been well documented. At the not inconsiderable risk
of carrying the goose metaphor too far, a common refrain was that the New Royalty Framework
was akin to “killing the goose that lays the golden egg.” In response, the government launched a
Competitiveness Review late in 2009, which, among other things, re-examined royalties on
natural gas and conventional (non-oil sands) oil. As a result of that review, released in March
2010, the royalties imposed on natural gas and conventional oil were reduced.
Importantly, the Competitiveness Review did not include a re-examination of the oil sands
royalty regime implemented under the New Royalty Framework. Indeed, it seems safe to say
that the one aspect of the protracted royalty review process in Alberta that has generated
relatively little in the way of “hissing” — at the time and since — is the changes to the oil
sands royalty system.
This is all the more notable given the important role played by the oil sands in Alberta,
particularly on a “go-forward” basis. By 2013-14 oil sands royalties are expected to account
for over 60 percent of the projected $11.8 billion in government revenue from non-renewable
resources.2 CERI estimates that existing and under-construction oils sands projects alone
will add $2.3 trillion to Canadian GDP over the 2010-2035 period, and generate in excess of
$22 billion in annual royalties to Alberta by 2020. If additional pipeline capacity is added to
the US and Canadian west coast, and currently approved oil sands projects go ahead, GDP
could increase by as much $4.8 trillion over the 25-year period and annual royalties could be as
high as $65 billion by 2035.3 It is important to note that these estimates are based on analysis
undertaken after the New Royalty Framework was implemented.
2 From Government of Alberta, Budget 2011, Fiscal Plan Tables, at
http://www.finance.alberta.ca/publications/budget/budget2011/fiscal-plan-tables.pdf.
3 Canadian Energy Research Institute, Economic Impacts of Staged Development of Oil Sands Projects in Alberta
(2010-2035), Study No. 125 – Section 1, June 2011.
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The new regime introduced on January 1, 2009 maintains the basic structure of the oil sands
royalty system that has existed since 1997 under the so-called “generic regime.” Under this
structure, a gross royalty is imposed on gross revenue for “pre-payout” oil sands projects,
while a net royalty rate is imposed on net cash flow (which allows for the deduction of costs)
for “post-payout” projects. “Payout” occurs when the cumulative revenues from the project
exceed the cumulative costs (both operating and capital), including a return allowance.  
The key difference between the previous oil sands regime and the New Royalty Framework
introduced in 2009 is the determination of the gross and net royalty rates applied to pre- and
post-payout projects. Under the old regime the pre-payout gross royalty was a flat one percent
rate and the post-payout net royalty a flat 25 percent; in what follows this is sometimes
referred to as the old 1/25 regime. Under the new regime both rates are price-sensitive.
Specifically, the pre-payout gross royalty rate starts at a minimum of one percent and increases
in a linear fashion at the rate of 0.12308 percent per dollar increase in the price of West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) oil in excess of $55 CAD per barrel, reaching a maximum of nine percent
at a price of $120. The post-payout net royalty rate starts at a minimum of 25 percent and
increases linearly at the rate of 0.23077 percent per dollar increase in the price of oil in excess
of $55 CAD per barrel, reaching a maximum of 40 percent at $120. Figure 1 illustrates the
price-sensitive rate schedules under the New Royalty Framework.
FIGURE 1: Gross and Net Oil Sands Royalty Rate Schedule
Since the new scheme was implemented in 2009, oil prices have risen steadily. Figure 2 shows
the per-barrel price of WTI oil in Canadian dollars from January 2009 to June 2011 (left axis),
as well as the price-sensitive gross and net royalty rates corresponding to those prices (right
axis).  As can be seen, early in 2009 the price of oil was under $55 and both the gross and net
royalty rates were at their minimums, which are equal to the old regime rates of one percent
and 25 percent respectively. In April 2009 the price started increasing and has remained above
the $55 threshold ever since. As a result, the price-sensitive gross and net royalty rates have
remained consistently above the old 1/25 flat rates.  
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FIGURE 2: Monthly Oil Sands Gross and Net Royalty Rates, 2009-2011
SOURCE: Alberta Energy, Monthly Royalty Rates, at http://www.energy.alberta.ca/OilSands/1513.asp.
Table 1 shows the average Canadian dollar price of a barrel of WTI oil in 2009, 2010 and the
first six months of 2011, along with the associated gross and net royalty rates. In 2009 the price
of oil averaged around $66 over the year, and the associated gross and net royalty rates
averaged 2.5 percent and 27 percent respectively. As prices increased throughout 2010 and into
2011, the royalty rates increased accordingly. For the first six months of 2011 the gross royalty
rate averaged 5.9 percent and the net royalty rate averaged 35.6 percent.
TABLE 1: Average Gross and Net Royalty Rates on Oil Sands, 2009-2011
*First six months.
SOURCE: Author calculations; Alberta Energy, Monthly Royalty Rates, at  http://www.energy.alberta.ca/OilSands/1513.asp
How much additional revenue from the oil sands have these higher royalty rates generated for
the government of Alberta? If it is presumed that production from the oil sands over this period
was not significantly dampened by the higher royalty rates — an assumption that will be
addressed below — it is a relatively straightforward matter to answer this question.
Data from Alberta Energy on royalties collected from pre- and post-payout oil sands projects
for 2009 and 2010, and calculations of the impact of the New Royalty Framework on
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government revenues, are reported in Table 2. As can be seen, the vast bulk of royalties were
generated by the net royalty levied on post-payout projects — about 92 percent of royalties in
both 2009 and 2010. While pre-payout projects account for a relatively small amount of total
oil sands royalties, the percentage increase of the new price-sensitive gross royalty rate over
the old one percent gross royalty rate was quite significant (see Table 1). Thus, under the
assumptions stated above, in 2009 the new price-sensitive gross royalty generated $105 million
in additional royalty revenue over and above what would have been collected under the old one
percent rate. Similarly, the new price-sensitive net royalty generated $162 million in additional
royalty revenue. Thus, for 2009, additional oil sands royalties generated due to the higher
royalty rates under New Royalty Framework amounted to $267 million — a 13 percent
increase over the old regime. In 2010 the additional royalties due to the higher price-sensitive
royalty rates generated even more incremental revenue. The gross royalty on pre-payout
projects generated $224 million in incremental royalty revenue and the net royalty on post-
payout projects $649 million, for a total of $873 million — a 33 percent increase over the
royalties that would have been generated under the old 1/25 regime.
TABLE 2: Incremental Government of Alberta Revenues Under New Royalty Framework
Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
SOURCE: Author calculations; Alberta Energy, Alberta Energy Archive Information at
http://www.energy.alberta.ca/About_Us/1701.asp
But this is not quite the end of the story. While the higher royalty rates resulted in a significant
increase in royalty revenue for Alberta, because royalties are a deduction against corporate
income taxes there will be a slight reduction in corporate tax collections. Calculating this
reduction requires information on the “taxability” status of oil sands companies (i.e., whether
or not they are in a tax loss position), to which I am not privy. However, assuming that all of
the companies operating in the oil sands were in a fully corporate taxpaying position, the
reduction in Alberta corporate income taxes would be about $27 million in 2009 and $87
million in 2010. This suggests a net increase in total government of Alberta revenue due to the
new oil sands regime of $240 million in 2009 and $786 million in 2010; about 12 percent and
30 percent higher than the old 1/25 regime.4 The two-year total incremental increase in
government revenue due to the new oils sands regime is therefore just over $1 billion.
4 Because of royalty deductibility, under the same full taxability assumption corporate income tax collections on the
part of the federal government would also fall, by about $48.5 million in 2009 and $157.5 million in 2010.
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2009 2010
Pre-Payout
Actual Royalties $173 million $295 million
Incremental Royalties Over Old Regime $105 million $224 million
Post-Payout
Actual Royalties $2,144 million $3,226 million
Incremental Royalties Over Old Regime $162 million $649 million
Total
Actual Royalties $2,317 million $3,521 million
Incremental Royalties Over Old Regime $267 million $873 million
Reduced Alberta Corporate Income Taxes $27 million $87 million
Total Net Incremental Revenue Over Old Regime $240 million $786 million
As indicated above, in making these calculations it is presumed that production and investment
in the oil sands over the last two years remained unaffected by the new regime. This seems to
be a reasonable assumption for the short term given the long lead and lag times of oil sands
projects, and the costs associated with adjusting output on an operational level.
In the longer run, however, it is possible that the higher royalties on oil sands could dampen
investment, reducing the incremental increase in royalties under the new system. Table 3
provides calculations of effective tax rates (which reflect both corporate income taxes and
royalties) on investment in the oil sands using the University of Calgary’s School of Public
Policy Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) Model. The METRs provide an indication of the
extent to which the tax and royalty system impinge upon the incentive to undertake investment
in the sector. The METRs in the table are based upon the 2010 corporate income tax regime for
Alberta, for four different royalty scenarios. The first is the old 1/25 royalty regime; the next
three are for different rate scenarios under the new regime, corresponding to the actual royalty
rates for 2009, 2010 and for the first six months of 2011 (see Table 1). As indicated in the
table, the effective tax rate on investment in the oil sands sector does indeed increase due to the
higher royalty rates — from 21.4 percent under the old regime, to 22.1 percent under the
higher royalty rates that existed in 2009, 23.5 percent in 2010, and 25.5 percent in 2011.  This
suggests a slight dampening of investment due to the higher royalty rates.
TABLE 3: Marginal Effective Tax Rates, 2010 Corporate Income Tax System
SOURCE: Author calculations using The School of Public Policy METR Model.
What is noteworthy here, however, is the fact that while the METRs did indeed increase, the
proportional increase is significantly less than the increase in the royalty rates. For example,
over the first six months of 2011 oil prices average just under $95 per barrel. This was
associated with a net royalty rate of 35.6 percent, which is about 42 percent higher than the
flat 25 percent rate under the old regime. However, the METR on investment is less than
20 percent higher than it would have been under the old regime (25.5 percent vs. 21.4 percent).
How can the large increases in royalty rates under the new regime be reconciled with the
relatively modest increases in effective tax rates? The key is the structure of the oil sands
royalty regime. While the upfront royalties on pre-payout projects are based on gross revenue,
these are typically paid for a relatively short period of time and account for only 8 percent of
total oil sands royalties. More important from a long-run investment point of view are the net
royalties on post-payout projects. As indicated above, these are based on net cash flow, which
allows for the deduction of operating and capital costs. Thus, the government shares equally in
both the revenues and costs of oil sands projects.
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Gross and Net Royalty Rates METR
1%, 25% 21.4%
2.5%, 27% 22.1%
4.2%, 31.3% 23.5%
5.9%, 35.6% 25.5%
For this reason, if considered on its own in the absence of corporate income taxes, an increase
in the net royalty rate would have no impact on investment in the oil sands sector. This is
because a cash flow tax of this nature is “neutral” with respect to investment because revenues
and costs decrease proportionately.5 However, when interacted with the corporate income tax,
which allows royalty payments as a deduction, the impact of the net royalty is no longer
neutral.6 Nonetheless, as indicated in Table 3, the impact of the higher net royalty rate on the
METR is relatively modest, particularly in comparison to the magnitude of the increases in the
royalty rate.
The structure of the oil sands royalty regime and the relatively muted impact of the higher
royalty rates on the effective tax rate may also explain why such a significant increase in
royalties from the sector vis-a-vis the old regime generated little in the way of public resistance
on the part of the oil sands sector, particularly compared to the natural gas and conventional oil
sector. The structure of the royalty regimes for gas and conventional oil is fundamentally
different, based entirely on gross royalties levied on revenue. While there are adjustments for
production — intended as a rough proxy for costs — and special programs for higher cost
wells, these adjustments and programs are ad hoc, and do not result in the government sharing
in both the revenues and costs of oil and gas wells in the way that the oil sands regime does. In
particular, new developments in the extraction of “tight” gas and oil suggest that the old
relationships between cost and production that underlie the basic structure of the royalty
system may no longer be relevant. This invites rough, ad hoc adjustments to royalty rates in
response to changing conditions that are almost guaranteed to be “wrong” in some sense.
To sum up, the changes implemented to the oil sands royalty regime have generated
incremental revenue for the government of Alberta over the last two years in excess of
$1 billion. This has been done without generating the political outcry that accompanied much
of the changes to conventional oil and gas as a part of the royalty review process. On a “go-
forward” basis, while the changes in the oil sands royalty regime will be expected to dampen
investment in the oil sands sector somewhat, this impact is relatively modest in comparison to
the increase in royalty rates. It is argued that all of this is due to the basic structure of the oil
sands royalty system, a large part of which is based upon a cash flow approach under which
the government shares equally in the costs and revenues of oil sands projects.
The experience with the oil sands provides some important lessons for royalty policy, and
indeed for tax policy in general. In particular, it emphasizes that the structure of the system —
the base upon which the tax or royalty is applied — is at least as important as the rates. It also
suggests that it is possible to generate increased revenue without a great deal of either
economic or political discomfort — we can pluck the goose that lays the golden eggs without
killing it, much less generating a lot of “hissing.” This lesson may well be applied to royalties
in the conventional oil and gas sector. Anyone ready for another royalty review?
5 See Robin Boadway and Neil Bruce (1984), “A General Proposition for the Design of a Neutral Business Tax,”
Journal of Public Economics, 24(2), 231-239.
6 See Jack M. Mintz, “An Evaluation of the Business Tax Recommendations of the Henry Review and the Australian
Government Response,” in Australia’s Future Tax System: The Prospects After Henry, edited by C. Evans, R. Krever
and P. Mellor, Thompson Reuters, 2010, 162-82
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